Robert M. Mcrae v. The Industrial Commission of Utah Mcrae and Deland, the workers compensation fund of Utah, and the Second Injury Fund : Unknown by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Robert M. Mcrae v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah Mcrae and Deland, the workers
compensation fund of Utah, and the Second Injury
Fund : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Keith E. Sohm; Sohm & Sohm; attorney for appellant.
Barbara Elicerio; Industrial commission of Utah; Erie Boorman; Second Injury Fund; James R Black,
Kevin M. McDonough; Black & Moore; attorneys for respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Mcrae v. Industrial Commission, No. 870431 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/634
DUMENT 
U 
I 
BRIEF 
-KPT MO VCHU'CA 
FILED 
SEP 27 1988 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
MCRAE k DELAND, THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, and 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
APPELLANT MEMORANDUM 
OF ARGUMENT 
Admin. Law Judge: 
Rich?.rd G. Sumsion 
Court of Appeals No, 
87-0431-CA 
Priority No. 6 
FACTS (p. 5, 9-13, 15) 
We accept Judge Sumsion's Finding of Facts as follows: 
1. The applicant is a practicing trial attorney with offices 
in Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. On June 28-29, 1985 
the applicant sustained a severe heart attack during the course 
of his employment. The diary or schedule kept by his secretary 
shows that on June 28, 1985, he was scheduled for depositions 
in the morning, two trials in the Circuit Court, and a meeting 
with a client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after 
lunch, he had severe stomach pains prompting him to go to the 
Ashley Valley Medical Center. He had blood drawn and underwent 
an EKG and was told a serum test would be made. To his 
knowledge, he went to the oil field to meet with his client. 
Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good. He had dinner 
downtown, because his wife was in Salt Lake City. The hospital 
explained to him the reason for the blood serum test. 
Apparently they suspected an ulcer condition. He decided not 
to stay in the hospital, even though he had been asked to 
so. The following morning, June 29, 1985, he returned to 
Ashley Valley Medical Center for a repeat 
another EKG. He then went to his office, 
scheduled to be involved in depositions. 
blood test 
because he 
do 
the 
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was 
2. The applicant proceeded with the depositions the morning of 
June 29, 1985, but around 11:00 a.m. Dr. Norman Nielsen called 
from the hospital and informed the applicant he was having a 
heart attack and he was to get to the hospital immediately. He 
finished the deposition in which he was involved and then sent 
his secretary home to get some clothes* He then drove three 
blocks to the hospital. He was then sent by lifeline to Salt 
Lake City, where he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital. 
He recalls very little that happened after that for a period of 
some fourteen days. He underwent a triple bypass surgery on 
July 1, 1985. He was told that he came very close to dying on 
a couple of occasions. He was released from the hospital on 
July 16, 1985. He returned to active practice around August 
12, 1985 but on a limited basis, avoiding court appearances, 
and has continued to do so to the present time. 
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated with the 
applicant's particular practice of law. It is probably safe to 
assume that it was a MORE STRESSFUL PRACTICE than engaged in by 
most attorneys. . . .chronic job stress is considered by 
cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to coronary 
atheroscerosis. (R. 392) 
This is not to say that he was not working under stressful 
circumstances. To the contrary, as noted previously, the 
applicant's type and style of practice could justifiably be 
characterized as MORE STRESSFUL than most attorneys'. (R. 393) 
He was a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has been 
engaged in heavy trial x^ ork for more than 25 years. 
II. OVERRIDING PRINCIPAL (Brief, p. 4, 37) 
Worker's Compensation claims must be: 
A. Liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits. 
B. Doubts are to be resolved in favor of applicant. 
III. AN ACCIDENT IS: (Brief, p. 5, 6) 
Keller case and Judge Leonard Elton Case (Attachment No. 3 ) : 
1. A heart attack meets the test of an accident as 
being unexpected and unintended (p. 28). Appellant meets that 
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2. An internal failure brought about by exertion in the 
course of employment may be an accident. Stress can be and is 
analogous to exertion (Larsen, p. 23; Elton, p. 28). 
3. Aggravation of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable (Keller, p. 25; Elton, p. 23). 
The Keller case is a good example (p. 26, 27). Mr. Keller 
had pre-existing heart, diabetes, hypertension, gout and other 
problems. He was working inside the roof section of a building in 
heat described as "very warm and extremely stuffy". He had to be 
helped out and was given oxygen and died four days later of a heart 
attack. The Judge, Commission and Supreme Court accepted Dr. 
YanowitzJs statement that STRESS affected Keller's heart even though 
Keller was a high risk because of his heart condition, age, 
hypertension, diabetes, gout and other problems. The Court upheld 
the Commission in finding that he was engaged in a stressful job and 
that emotional stress and pressures could aggravate a pre-existing 
condition resulting in a heart attack. The Judge Elton case held 
that as a result of a deterioration of health brought on by the 
stresses of highly sensitive cases handled by him during the last 
six weeks of his life, the Judge died as a result of an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment. 
In our case, McRae had fewer pre-existing problems and 
had an immediate ON-THE-JOB HEART ATTACK AFTER A STRESSFUL DAY AND 
STRESSFUL WEEK. 
IV. A COMPENSABLE INJURY requires: 
1. Injury must be "by accident" (stress, etc.). 
2. Arising out of or in the course of employment. Causal 
connection between the injury and employment. 
3. Where there is a pre-existing condition, there must be some 
degree of exertion. 
A. Nazum case: Only SLIGHT exertion is required (p. 16). 
B. Schmidt and Purity Biscuit case: Only USUAL exertion 
is required (p. 18). 
C. Allen and Lancaster cases: Adopted the Purity USUAL 
exertion and unexpected result tests (p. 31) and set 
two tests: 
1. Legal Cause — employment contributed to increase 
the risk he faced in EVERYDAY life (p. 32) "the 
exertions of normal, non-employment life of this 
or any other person" (p. 35). 
Allen case states an example of non-employment 
activities: 
In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, 
the focus is on what typical nonemployment 
activities are generally expected of people in 
today's society, not what this particular 
claimant is accustomed to doing. Typical 
activities and exertions expected of men and 
women in the latter part of the 20th century, 
for example, include taking full garbage cans to 
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for 
travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, 
lifting a small child to chest height, and 
climbing the stairs in buildings. 
2. Medical Cause—must show stress, strain or 
exertion leading to an aggravation resulting in 
the injury (p. 33). 
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V. THE JUDGE CORRECTLY FOUND MCRAE'S PRACTICE WAS MORE STRESSFUL 
THAN OTHER ATTORNEYS (p. 7,8) 
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated 
with the applicant's particular practice of law. It 
is probably safe to assume that it was a MORE 
STRESSFUL PRACTICE than engaged in by most attorneys, 
.chronic job stress is considered by 
cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to 
coronary atheroscerosis. (R. 392) 
This is not to say that he was not working under 
stressful circumstances. To the contrary, as noted 
previously, the applicant's type and style of 
practice could justifiably be characterized as MORE 
STRESSFUL than most attorneys'. (R. 393) 
He was a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has 
been engaged in heavy trial work for more than 25 
years. 
THESE FINDINGS (not objected to by respondents) complete Un-
necessary finding of a LEGAL CAUSE. 
1. LEGAL CAUSE test requires a finding that the 
employment contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in EVERYDAY LIFE. 
The Judge found that the McRae job stress was greater 
than other attorneys (p. 35, 36), which in turn means 
clearly that appellant's stress at work was greater 
than that found in the "normal non-employment life of 
this or any other person.'* 
2. The medical test was met by the highly-respected 
treating physician, Dr. Null, who stated 
unequivocally: 
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension 
related to his occupation are certainly associated 
with an aggravation to produce his myocardial 
infarction. (R. 125) 
VI. JUDGE SUMSION ERRED when he misapplied the Allen test. Doctor 
Perry erred in the same way. 
Instead of relating the June 28 and 29 (and earlier days) 
activities to "the exertions of normal non-employment life of this 
or any other person", the Judge compared the activities of June 28 
and 29 to McRae's own work load as an attorney. The Judge DENIED 
compensation because he did not find any "significant change in his 
job requirements, the level of physical activity, the number of 
hours worked, or the stresses he experienced in the months prior 
thereto" (p. 34). The test should be based on exertions of ordinary 
non-employment life of an ordinary person. 
CONCLUSION 
THE JUDGE AND THE DOCTOR ERRED when they applied a test 
comparing appellant's activities on dates of injury to appellanl's 
own prior activities generally. It is irrelevant whether or not he 
worked harder or was under more stress on June 28 and 29, 1988 than 
usual. The test is whether his employment on those two and prior 
days was more stressful than non-employment life of the average-
individual . 
When the Judge found Mcrae's work MORE STRESSFUL than other 
attorney's, then the legal test is more than met. 
THEREFORE, based on the Judge's own findings and a proper 
application of the law, applicant is entitled to recover full 
compensation benefits for his industrial injury. 
- 6 -
Dated t h i s 27th day of Sep tember , 1988. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
Keithr E. Sohm 
A t t o r n e y f o r V p p e l l a n t 
cc To Gounsel for Defendants in Court September 27, 1988. 
Delivered to Office of Erie Boorman and Barbara E l i c e r i o 
a t 160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, t h i s 27th day of 
September, 1988. 
(e i th E. Sohm 
